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cf-serverd: Fixed off-by-one stack overflow in acl_CheckPath() - #6518
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acl_CheckPath() copies the requested path, reqpath_len + 1 bytes, into char mangled_path[PATH_MAX] before substituting the $(connection.*) variables, without checking that it fits. The TLS OPENDIR handler, and STAT when the target is a directory, append a trailing slash to the PreprocessRequestPath() result before calling acl_CheckPath(). That result lives in filename[CF_BUFSIZE + 1] and realpath() returns up to PATH_MAX - 1 characters, so a directory whose canonical path is 4095 characters reaches acl_CheckPath() as a 4096 character string, and the memcpy() writes the terminating NUL one byte past mangled_path on the stack of cf-serverd. This happens before any access decision, so a client that completed the TLS handshake can trigger it with an OPENDIR or STAT naming such a directory, for example through a short symlink to a deep directory that any local user can create under /tmp. A path that long cannot hold the expanded variables either, so skip the special variable check for it, the same as when ReplaceSpecialVariables() overflows. Paths shorter than PATH_MAX are unchanged. Changelog: Title Signed-off-by: Dhanraj E <dhanraj@labs.digiscrypt.com>
larsewi
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Nov 20, 2026
larsewi
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Thanks 🚀 The commit message is rather long and confusing for such a small and trivial fix. Please shorten it.
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@cf-bottom Jenkins please :) |
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Sure, I triggered a build: Jenkins: https://ci.cfengine.com/job/pr-pipeline/15159/ Packages: http://buildcache.cfengine.com/packages/testing-pr/jenkins-pr-pipeline-15159/ |
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acl_CheckPath() copies the requested path, reqpath_len + 1 bytes, into
char mangled_path[PATH_MAX] before substituting the $(connection.*)
variables, without checking that it fits. The TLS OPENDIR handler, and
STAT when the target is a directory, append a trailing slash to the
PreprocessRequestPath() result before calling acl_CheckPath(). That
result lives in filename[CF_BUFSIZE + 1] and realpath() returns up to
PATH_MAX - 1 characters, so a directory whose canonical path is 4095
characters reaches acl_CheckPath() as a 4096 character string, and the
memcpy() writes the terminating NUL one byte past mangled_path on the
stack of cf-serverd.
This happens before any access decision, so a client that completed
the TLS handshake can trigger it with an OPENDIR or STAT naming such a
directory, for example through a short symlink to a deep directory that
any local user can create under /tmp.
A path that long cannot hold the expanded variables either, so skip the
special variable check for it, the same as when ReplaceSpecialVariables()
overflows. Paths shorter than PATH_MAX are unchanged.
Checked with an AddressSanitizer build of acl_CheckPath(), ReplaceSpecialVariables(), PathAppendTrailingSlash() and StringReplace() taken from the tree, fed a 4095 character canonical path the way the OPENDIR handler does: stack-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 4097 into the 4096 byte mangled_path before the change, clean after.